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China played an important role during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, a time when 
drastic changes occurred in the arena of international politics. In 1971 Pakistan 
faced a great tragedy in the shape of the separation of East Pakistan. On December 
16, 1971, Pakistan’s Eastern part was separated from West Pakistan. The Indo-Pak 
war was a major concern for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which had 
developed deep relations with Pakistan in the 1960s. China’s reasons for the devel-
opment of these relations with Pakistan were numerous, including the deterioration 
of China-India relations due to the 1962 border clashes, and the importance of the 
Indian-Subcontinent for superpower politics in the same time period. 
 While the East Pakistan crisis culminated in the India-Pakistan war and 
breakdown of diplomatic relations between Delhi and Beijing, the relations be-
tween Pakistan and China had already been strengthened in the era of Ayub Khan 
(1959-1969). The Ayub Khan era saw the beginning of Pakistan’s move away from 
the orbit of the Western world as direct consequence of Pakistan’s disillusionment 
with the politico-military pacts such as SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organiza-
tion) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). During this time Ayub Khan also 
“normalized relations with China based on strong friendship constructed within 
the framework of the principles of Third world solidarity.”1 During Ayub Khan’s 
era, a border agreement signed between Pakistan and China on March 3, 1963 was 
an indication of the genesis of the cooperation and understanding on all fields of 
Sino-Pakistani relations, including diplomatic, economic, and cultural. This trend 
of mutual trust persisted into the 1970s. Geographical proximity is one more im-
portant key element in the evolvement of Sino-Pakistan relations. In 1969, Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto wrote that “China is our neighbor country and it is essential for us to 
maintain good relations with all our neighbors on the basis of friendship and equal-
ity.”2 Both countries are contiguous to each other and share India as their common 
hostile neighbor. Moreover, China’s ideological differences with the US and USSR 
affected China’s regional interests. A close relation between Pakistan and China 
provided the ideal counterbalance to the anti-Chinese feelings and anti-Pakistani 
feelings that prevailed in India in the 1960s. Moreover, Pakistan was quite effective 
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in Third World cause and one of the most populous Islamic countries in the world. 
Friendship of both countries (China-Pakistan) held many possible advantages for 
the PRC itself in the pursuance of the Maoist global objectives. Moreover, China’s 
support for Pakistan also coincided with the pragmatic interests of the Chinese 
leadership.
 China’s supportive policy towards Pakistan came at that time when China 
had reappeared at international diplomatic scene with a new agenda, and one of 
the repercussions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966) was its impact on the 
PRC. China’s reaction in East Pakistan issue revealed the essence of Chinese inter-
est in that region as perceived in Beijing.
 The most important statement of Beijing’s position in the East Pakistan 
crisis was Premier Chou En Lai’s message to President of Pakistan, General Ya-
hya Khan, in April 1971, in which he showed his full support for Pakistan. Chou 
En Lai’s letter addressed many points involving crisis of East Pakistan, including 
the emphasis that unification of the East and West Pakistan was one of the “basic 
guarantees” for the construction of Pakistani prosperity. Secondly, Chou En Lai 
also referred to the separatist movement in East Pakistan as a “handful movement” 
that desired to sabotage Pakistani unification. Chou En Lai emphasized that “broad 
masses of the people” had no leaning whatsoever in the direction of separatism. He 
further said that India was guilty of “gross interference” and exploitation of Paki-
stan’s internal affairs, while also accusing the super powers and India of meddling 
in the internal problems of Pakistan, arguing that Pakistan’s domestic affairs and 
should be resolved internally by Pakistani leadership. Lastly, Chou assured China’s 
support to Pakistan in the event that the “State and sovereignty and national inde-
pendence” of Pakistan was threatened by the aggression of the Indian expansion-
ists. Until December, China proclaimed support for the Government of Pakistan. 
For instance, on May 11, 1971, in an editorial, Jin Men Jih Pao condemned “Wash-
ington and Moscow for working in close coordination with the Indian reactionaries 
to crudely interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan.”3
 Under the treaty with the Soviet Union, India received arms assistance while 
the US ordered to halt military supplies to Pakistan, “a dilemma which Pakistan 
protested only broadened the arms dangerous imbalances in favor of India. A vast 
Indian military moved along the East India Pakistan border raised the tense atmo-
sphere in Pakistan and was intensified by the aggrandizement of the Indian support-
ed guerilla activities.”4 Yahya Khan sent a delegation to China under the leadership 
of Bhutto. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chi Peng Fei, stated that secessionists 
were only a handful while the broad masses of Pakistan were patriotic and wanted 
to safeguard national unity. Interestingly, Chi Peng Fei did not repeat the speech 
of Chou En Lai. This was, however, hardly surprising since President Nixon’s visit 
77
Farooq
to China had already altered China’s perception of its role in the region and China 
was working towards normalizing its relations with the US. The Chinese foreign 
Minister suggested that the issue between two nations should be resolved through 
negotiations rather than aggression. The Pakistani delegation was unsuccessful in 
getting solid support from China. China did promise to support Pakistan if India 
attacked. 
 The Indo-Pakistan war began on December 3, 1971, when Indian army 
crossed the international border into East Pakistan. China declared its support for 
Pakistan, while the Soviet Union backed India, a collusion that intensified through-
out the duration of the war.  Beijing vehemently accused Moscow of supporting In-
dian military provocation and subversive activities towards Pakistan. The Soviets, 
on the other hand, were described by Deng Xiansheng and other Chinese leaders 
as the power that both occupied the Soviet Union’s alleged “ally” Czechoslovakia 
and instigated the war to dismember Pakistan. The UN’s General Assembly was 
transformed into the hub of Chinese protest on behalf of Pakistan.  Clearly the hard 
Sino–Soviet dialogue in the UN during the period of War showed the significant 
influence of the traditional Sino-Soviet dispute regarding the PRC’s assistance to 
Pakistan. The Soviet’s usage of Veto Power in the UN that encouraged New Delhi 
to capture the territory of another state “was described as tactic designed to permit 
India the necessary time to present to the world of a fait accompli that is as an oc-
cupied East Pakistan.”5
 In 1970, Yahya Khan helped the US establish relations with China that re-
sulted in a 1971 visit to China by then US National Security Adviser, Henry Kiss-
inger. Pakistan played key role as a bridge between the US and China. Pakistan 
provided crucial support in China’s membership of the UN as “Peoples Republic of 
China”  which resulted in PRC’s inclusion as a full member on October 25, 1971. 
The Chinese, in turn, showed support for Pakistan by raising a draft resolution at 
the United Nations. In this resolution, China strongly condemned 
the Indian Government’s acts of creating so called Bangla Desh and sub-
verting, dismembering and committing aggression against Pakistan and 
raised a plea that all nations support Pakistan in their just struggle to resist 
Indian aggression and mutual troops disengagement and withdrawal.”6 
On December 7, 1971, a resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and on 
December 21, 1971, another resolution (NO: 307) adopted by the Security Council 
called for the immediate end to the war and troops withdrawal on the both sides.”7 
Huang Hua, the PRC representative at the UN Security Council, expressed the 
“dissatisfaction of China over the failure of the resolution to make anyone note of 
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Indian aggression” and any call for the support of Pakistan although China voted 
for the resolution.”8
 Pakistan received moral and verbal support from China in the 1970s. China 
also took every opportunity to criticize India and the Soviets. On December 16, 
1971 China gave its final statement in support of Pakistan when Pakistani forces 
surrendered, stating: 
The Soviet Government has played a shameful role in the war of aggression 
launched by India against Pakistan. The whole world has clearly seen that 
it is back stage manager of the Indian expansionists. For many years the 
Soviet Government has energetically been fostering the Indian reactionaries 
and abetting India in its outward expansion.9
 The Chinese attitude remained the same throughout the period of turmoil 
in Pakistan. But in another statement, the Chinese, for the first time, recognized 
the refugee problem in East Pakistan: “As for the question of the return of the East 
Pakistan refugees to their homeland, it should, and can only be settled by India and 
Pakistan through consultation.”10 Neither Chi Peng- fei’s speech to the Pakistan 
delegation in November nor Chou En Lai’s message to Yahya Khan in the previous 
April made any reference to the existence of the refugee problem in East Pakistan.
 China emphasized the importance of negotiation rather than conflict in 
seeking a diplomatic resolution in East Pakistan. China described Bangladesh as a 
“puppet regime” which was “inserted into East Pakistan by armed forces,” and the 
Soviet Union was accused of increasing arms shipments to India in order to “bolster 
and pep up” the Indian aggression.11 China once again protested the Soviet Union’s 
tactics at the UN, stating that “what makes people indignant is that the representa-
tive of the Soviet Government in the UN Security council has time and again used 
the veto to obstruct the ceasefire and troops withdrawal which are desired by the 
overwhelming majority of the countries and the people over the world.”12 Chou En 
Lai declared that the separation of East Pakistan “was an event which marked the 
commencement of endless strife on the Subcontinent and the beginning of India’s 
ultimate defeat.”13 China supported Pakistan politically, morally, and materially, 
discontinuing American military shipments in March in 1971. Given the diplomatic 
background of Sino-Pakistani relations, the Chinese clearly provided a politically 
logical alternative to the US.14 China gave military aid to Pakistan from 1966 until 
the outbreak of the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, serving as Pakistan’s main source 
of arms15 (according to the US observer in Pakistan, during the five year period 
from 1961 to 1966, Beijing contributed over $130 million worth of military equip-
ment and supplies). A Pakistani spokesman revealed in 1971 that the “PRC had 
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dispatched 200 military instructors to Pakistan for the purpose of the training of 
Pakistani troops for guerilla warfare.”16 Moreover, according to a US observer, in 
the final week of the Indo Pak. War, “China supplied 200,000 rounds of anti-craft 
and tank ammunition for Pakistan.”17 Indian Institute for Defense Studies (I. I. D. 
S.) estimated that the free Chinese arms assistance of Pakistan in 1971-72 consisted 
of 225 T-59 tanks, one squadron of II-28 bombers, and four squadrons of MIG-19 
interceptors, along with “an unspecified number of river boats and coasters and 
Chinese assistance in the construction of two major ordinance factories.”18
 However, since the Soviets had signed a treaty with India, openly support-
ing Pakistan could have provoked war between China and the Soviet Union.  The 
PRC would not endorse the Bangladesh movement, which they did not regard as 
the “war of liberation.” Chou En Lai stated that it was a separatist movement perpe-
trated by a small group of persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan. 
Beijing issued the following statement about the nature of the war: “The Chinese 
government and people consistently oppose imperialism, expansionism, colonial-
ism and neocolonialism and firmly support the people of all countries in their just 
struggle in defense of their state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against 
foreign aggression, subversive, interference control and bullying. The war between 
India and Pakistan is a struggle between aggression and anti-aggression between 
division and anti-division between subversion and anti-subversion.”19      
 These international developments also affected the geo-strategic situation 
of Pakistan. These were clear-cut factors in shaping and determining Pakistan’s 
foreign policy in the 1970s. Pakistan secured independence in 1947 and from the 
outset its foreign policy was shaped by security issues relating to India, the resolu-
tion of the Kashmir dispute, and the acquisition of aid from the developed world. 
As Liaquat Ali Khan told the National Press Club in Washington during his official 
visit to the United States in May 1950, “Our strongest interests, therefore, are firstly 
the integrity of Pakistan.”20
 According to Keith Callard, the primary object of Pakistan’s foreign policy 
since its independence “had to be to show the world that Pakistan was a reality and 
was capable of maintaining its independence.”21President Ayub Khan wrote that, 
“We have an enemy, an implacable enemy in India,” and referred to “India’s ambi-
tion to absorb Pakistan and turn her into a satellite.” The Indian leaders made no 
secret of their political designs. Mr. Acharya Kripalani, who was President of the 
Indian National Congress in 1947, declared that “neither the Congress nor the na-
tion has given up its claim of United India.”22 On March 19, 1966, Bhutto asserted 
that India could not tolerate the existence of Pakistan and that “in the destruction 
of Pakistan lay India’s most sublime and finest dream.”23 On December 21, 1973, 
Bhutto defined the objectives of his foreign policy: “The object of a foreign policy 
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is to promote friendship, to foster understanding, to clarify certain issues and to 
remove frictions and confusions.”24 In Pakistan’s quest for security, territorial in-
tegrity, and national unity, equitable settlement of its disputes with other states and 
economic development for the welfare of the people were the principle objectives 
of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Security was another constant factor, as G. W. Chaud-
hury details: 
In search for security against a potential Indian threat, Pakistan turned to the 
Commonwealth and to the Muslim countries in the early years of her inde-
pendence (1947-53); then she turned to the USA by entering into a number 
of bilateral and multilateral defensive pacts. Then in the 1960’s Pakistan 
found that her Western allies had disturbed the balance of power in the 
Subcontinent by arming India against China … Pakistan therefore turned to 
new friends, if not allies, in her same search for security.25
 During the War of 1971, China had a pivotal role in formulation of Paki-
stan’s foreign policy. The Chinese veto on the admission of Bangladesh into the 
United Nations was a statement of complete political support for Pakistan during 
this crucial time.
      
CHINA’S POLICY DURING THE WAR OF 1971
The domestic crisis had massive regional and international ramifications. It is to 
these we will now turn, paying especial attention to China’s response to the unfold-
ing crisis in Pakistan. China’s initial response was made public on April 12 via a 
message from Chou En-Lai to Yahya Khan.26 The main points of this message were 
as follows:
(i) the “happenings in Pakistan”  “a purely internal affair” to be solved by 
Pakistani people without “foreign interference”. This favored the principle 
of non-intervention could also be seen in China’s protest Note to India of 6 
April 1971; 
(ii) That China opposed the separatists as was seen in the expression:  “The 
unification of Pakistan and the unity of the people of East and West Pakistan 
are the basic guarantees” for Pakistan’s prosperity and strength;
(iii)   China felt the separatists to be in a minority, “a handful of persons who 
want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan”; 
(iv)  on the issue of solving problems, China’s preference for negotiations 
can be see in the expression that “through the wise consultation and efforts” 
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of the Government and “leaders of various quarter in Pakistan”, the situa-
tion will remain peaceful; 
(v) taking note of the “gross interference” by India in the affairs of Pakistan, 
China understood the US and the USSR collusion with India. In the protests 
note of 6 April also China accused India of “‘flagrantly’ interfering in the 
internal affairs of Pakistan”;
 (vi) that China’s support to Pakistan was assured if “the Indian expansion-
ists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan.”
During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, China adopted the non-intervention policy 
that it had suggested in the previous April. China repeatedly reminded Pakistan of 
its support. Bhutto, along with an eight-man delegation, visited Peking as the per-
sonal representative of the President. The reasons for this visit were manifold and 
included both the expansion of Indian troops on the East Pakistan border and the 
increase of activity of guerrillas trained by India, as the shelling of border towns 
between India and Pakistani troops in East Wing increased the danger of a fight 
between the two.  Additionally, on August 9 1971, India signed the Twenty Years 
treaty of peace with USSR, who correspondingly increased military aid to India. 
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, had visited European countries 
to encourage a favorable world opinion of India, while the US stopped military aid 
from March 25th 1971, and cancelled licenses for the exports of 3,600,000 dollars 
worth of military equipment to Pakistan.  India, in contrast, received arms supply 
from the USSR, further widening the military disequilibrium in the South Asia. In 
this crisis, Pakistan sought strong military and diplomatic aid and China was the 
only country that was able to provide support. Although no joint communiqué was 
issued at the end of Bhutto’s visits, it may have been because he was not holding an 
official governmental post at the time.
 Minister Chi Peng fei stated China’s stance on the crisis in a speech, the 
message of which was later reiterated by Premier Chou En lai: “should Pakistan 
be subjected to foreign aggression,”27 “China would play a positive role in favor 
of Pakistan, “resolutely support[ing] the Pakistan Government and People in their 
just struggle to defend their state sovereignty and national independence”28 Mr. 
Chi Peng fei expressed the view that “secessionists were a handful of persons” and 
“broad masses of Pakistan are patriotic and want to safeguard the national unity 
and oppose internal split and outside interference.29 China stressed that “disputes 
between states should always be settled through consultation and not by resorting 
to force.”30 Indian interference activities in East Pakistan were criticized on the 
basis of China’s support for the principle of non-intervention. It is also important to 
note that China did not reiterate its previous allegation that the US was collaborat-
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ing with India. This omission was likely related to President Nixon’s planned visit 
to Peking.
 President Nixon’s visit was a “complete success.” Yahya Khan and Bhutto 
pointed out the possibility of China’s intervention if India attacked Pakistan. It 
was a distant possibility because Pakistan was not extremely concerned that China 
intervene in its affairs China did not give any assurance of physical intervention or 
diversionary action on the Sino-Indian border. 
 On November 22, 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani War, the Indian Army en-
tered East Pakistan.  China continued to constantly reaffirm its support for Pakistan. 
China denounced India and the Soviet Union on different occasions, such as during 
the reception on the Albanian Independence Day, at the banquet in the honor of the 
Sudanese delegation and the United Nations forum, and on the Tanzanian National 
Day. China opposed the Soviet Union’s interference and expansion in Asia, since 
the Soviet Union supported India militarily and in its subversive activities against 
Pakistan. When Bangladesh was recognized by India, China denounced it as arising 
from New Delhi force and as a puppet “forcibly imposed” upon the East Pakistani 
People by India. 
 Siding with Pakistan, China denounced the twenty-year treaty of peace that 
it had signed with India and the Soviet Union.  During speeches at the United Na-
tions, China reminded the UN what the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia and of 
the actions of India in Tibet and Kashmir. Debates were held at the Security Council 
and the General Assembly regarding the Indo-Pakistani conflict. These debates also 
evidence the growing differences between China and the Soviet Union.
 China drafted a resolution that condemned India and requested that warring 
parties withdraw their troops, calling on “all states to support Pakistan” in its strug-
gle to resist “Indian aggression.”31 China voted for the General Assembly resolution 
of 7 December 1971. The Chinese representative, Chiao Kuan- Hua, called for a 
ceasefire and withdrawal of troops between the two countries. “China, however, ex-
pressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the resolution did not denounce India’s 
aggression toward Pakistan.”32
 The Indian government claimed that the problem of East Pakistani refu-
gees necessitated invasion of Pakistan.  India also sheltered the exiled government 
of China’s Tibet, headed by the Chinese traitor Dalai Lama who was a Buddhist 
leader of religious officials of the “Yellow Hat” branch of Tibetan Buddhism. The 
Indian Government used the refugee question as pretext for invading Pakistan, 
much as they used the Tibetan refugees as a pretext for invading China.  Both 
scenarios provide evidence of India’s attempt to become a superpower. The ag-
gression against Pakistan was the outcome of the implementation of these expan-
sionist actions. China also voted in the UN Security Council on December 21, 
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1971. China’s stance was that the world should not pardon the serious crimes that 
India had committed against Pakistan. China opposed flagrant aggression, interfer-
ence and subversive activities of Indian imperialism and colonialism towards other 
countries. The People’s Republic of China also supported the Pakistani people in 
their struggle against aggression and subversion. The Chinese were optimistic that 
Pakistan would achieve a victory. The Chinese showed their complete solidarity 
with Pakistan by opposing the proposal of the Soviet Union to invite a “Bangla 
Desh” representative to participate in debate of the United Nations and by voting 
against the Soviet resolution that called for a ceasefire without withdrawal. The 
Soviet resolution of 5 December secured two votes of Poland, and the Soviet reso-
lution with 12 abstentions passed. The People’s Republic of China’s representative 
Huang Hua voted against the Soviet draft resolution due to reasons such as Indian 
direct interference and aggression in Pakistan, an endeavor which was supported by 
the Soviet government’s provision of large quantities of arms to the Indian expan-
sionists.  China saw that the main aim of the Soviet Union was to compete with the 
US for world hegemony and that the Soviet’s assistance of India was in service of 
this goal: the control over India, fostered by India’s dependence on the Soviet’s for 
military support, could lead to Soviet dominance of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent 
and the Indian Ocean, allowing the USSR to spread its sphere of influence. Due 
to these reasons China voted against the Soviet draft resolution. Peking Review 
commented, “India launched a large scale of war of aggression against Pakistan 
on November 21,1971 with an active encouragement and energetic support of the 
government of the Soviet Union. They wanted not only to swallow up East Pakistan 
but also to destroy Pakistan as a whole. If a timely stop is not put to such aggression 
committed by the Indian Government, Pakistan will not be the only country to fall 
victim, inevitably other countries neighbouring on India will also be endangered.”33
 The Chinese Government thus firmly supported the Pakistani Government 
and its people in their struggle against aggression, division, and subversion: “they 
not only were doing this politically, but will continue to give them material as-
sistance. China said that there can be no neutrality on the question of aggression 
versus anti aggression, of division versus division, and of subversion versus anti-
subversion. Certain big powers making no distinction between right and wrong and 
remaining inactive and silent have all along allowed the aggressor to grow through 
appeasement.”34
 It is noteworthy that, after the outbreak of the war, Pakistan played the role 
of a bridge between China and the United States, fostering cooperation between the 
two powers.  As a result, in 1971 China visited the United States and vice versa, 
resolving previous misunderstandings. Like China, the US also accused India of 
aggression35 and Moscow of blocking “international action until the capture of East 
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Pakistan was a fait accomplish.”36 Pakistan also believed that India’s treaty with the 
Soviet Union encouraged Indian aggression against Pakistan. Also, with support 
from India, a guerrilla movement developed in East Pakistan.  The US also men-
tioned the “strategic expansion of Soviet Power.”37 Both the US and China voted 
for the same resolutions in the General Assembly and the Security Council. In the 
joint communiqué which was issued in Peking, both countries called for the obser-
vance and implementation of the Security Council resolution of 21 December. They 
did not recognize “Bangladesh.” Nonetheless, the use of the term “East Bengal” in 
place of East Pakistan in a US foreign policy report provided clarification that the 
US was not against the aspiration of East Pakistan. China, in this joint communi-
qué, supported Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence. 
 The last crucial official statement made by China on the Indo-Pakistani war 
occurred on December 16th, 1971. On this date, Pakistani forces surrendered in East 
Pakistan, because the “Indian Government is… moving massive troops to press 
on the capital; of East Pakistan, Decca.”38 The timing of the statement suggested 
that China was unaware of the surrender of the Pakistani forces. China’s stance on 
various issues—subversive activities, non-intervention, Indian aggression, and the 
Soviet Union’s role in the war—remained the same. 
 “Bangla Desh” was considered a “puppet regime” that India forcefully in-
serted into East Pakistan. China also recognized the existence of a nationality prob-
lem in East Pakistan, stating that the Pakistanis should be willing to seek a political 
solution in the spirit of understanding. China commented on the East Pakistan refu-
gee problem for the very first time and suggested that the problem should be settled 
by both India and Pakistan in a way that avoided the use of force. This attention 
to the refugee situation is significant because neither Premier Chou En-Lai, in his 
message on April 12, nor Chi Peng-fei, in his November 7 speech, had mentioned 
the refugee problem. The Chinese representative at the UN likened the issue to the 
Tibetan refugee problem, as it arose out of Indian interference with Pakistani af-
fairs.  China openly declared that it was not only supporting the Pakistani people 
politically but that it “would continue to give them material assistance.”39 India 
was warned against future aggression: “Henceforth there will be no tranquility… 
on the South Asia Subcontinent… the Indian expansionists will surely eat the bit-
ter fruit of their own making.”40 China’s advice, interestingly, “to the South Asian 
friendly countries” was “to strength their defense capabilities so as to hit back when 
attack[ed].”41
 China’s reaction to the occupation by the Indian troops was reflected in 
Premier Chou’s meaningful remark that the “fall of Dhaka is… the starting point of 
endless strife on the South Asian subcontinent and of their (the Indians) defeat.”42 
China also gave material assistance to Pakistan by providing 133 million dollars 
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worth of arms, remaining Pakistan’s main arms supplier between 1966 and 1971, 
during which the US and European countries had suspended arms trade with the 
country.
 At the end of the War, China also provided “all the weapons and ammuni-
tion” that Pakistan wanted, and some were supplied for free. The US Defense De-
partment revealed on 4 November that “Pakistan received arms via shipments from 
China and Romania. Moreover, excluding arms supply, China supported Pakistan 
in other ways as well. An Indonesian military spokesman disclosed that China had 
sent two hundred instructors to Pakistan to train Pakistani troops in counter-guer-
rilla warfare.”43 China also suggested reestablishing two divisions trained in West 
Pakistan to replace those sent to East Pakistan. In the field of naval and air forces, 
Pakistan faced difficulties. During the last days of war in East Pakistan, Chinese 
rescue ships were assembled in the Ganga Delta for the evacuation of the Pakistani 
army in East Pakistan. Whether these ships were stationed in the Ganga Delta for 
a possible evacuation was uncertain. The Chinese were ready to help Pakistan, and 
press reports reveal Moscow’s advice that India keep from attacking Chinese ships. 
The Chinese armada was in the Bay of Bengal during the War.
 China made a friendly gesture when ceasefire occurred in the West and 
Pakistani forces surrendered in the East. In spite of this, Bhashani urged Chairman 
Mao Tse Tung and Premier Chou En Lai, by means of letters, to recognize “Bangla 
Desh.” 
 Examining the role that China’s support played in Pakistani history sets the 
events in Pakistan in a historical analytical framework that enables us to look be-
yond the day-to-day events.  China sought to pursue an independent foreign policy 
line from both that of the US and the USSR. This was explicitly mentioned by Mao 
in a speech in September 1982, but it had been present during the previous decades: 
“Our general task is to unite the whole people and win the support of all our friends 
abroad in the struggle to build a great socialist country, defend world peace and 
advance the cause of human progress.”44 China’s foreign policy had been tradition-
ally influenced by The Five Principles (in handling international relations, China 
has consistently taken The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the guide 
instead of using social system, ideology or the concept of values as the criterion. 
These principles were first put forward by the late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai) 
of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. Theoretically, China’s solidarity with Pakistan was a result 
of the five principles of peaceful coexistence; these principles went directly against 
foreign aggression. China reiterated this stance in various speeches and statements 
during the time.
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 The War of 1971 was understood in China as a struggle between aggression 
and anti-aggression, between division and anti-division, and between subversion 
and anti-subversion. China condemned India because it was violating the Bandung 
Principles. Moreover, China did not forget Tibet and the border war with India. 
China did not endorse “the war of liberation” theory in East Pakistan. China did not 
consider the conflict a guerrilla war; it was fought by peasants and workers of their 
own area. In China’s eyes, the War of 1971 was a separatist movement started not 
by the broad masses of East Pakistan but by a “handful of persons” “who wanted 
to sabotage the unity” of Pakistan.  Further, the separation of East Pakistan did not 
take place until 1958, when martial law was imposed and the elite leadership of the 
Punjab did not allot power to East Pakistan. Instead of sharing power, the Punjab 
leadership ruled via the “One Unit,” which enabled them to merge the four provinc-
es of West Pakistan into one unit as a counterbalance against the numerical domina-
tion of the ethnic Bengalis of East Pakistan. The leadership of the Punjab did not 
want to see the participation of the East Pakistan in government. Chinese policy has 
always stated that guerrillas must fight their own wars without the help of foreign 
aid. Hence, China was averse to the policy of the Awami League. Mujibur Rahman 
was known as pro-American, and the Awami League stood for developed relations 
with India. China’s Red Cross society sent a message to the international committee 
of the Red Cross: 
The barbarous outrages perpetrated by the Indian occupation forces against 
innocent inhabitants in the eastern part of Pakistan not only flagrantly con-
travene the principle of humanitarianism and the December 21, 1971 reso-
lution of the U.N. Security council but also crudely trample upon the 1949 
Geneva conventions to which the Indian Government is a party…. We ap-
peal to the international committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red 
Cross societies and the National Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion and 
Sun Societies of various countries… condemn the Indian forces for their 
sanguinary atrocities of massacring Pakistan People.45
 Apart from these verbal and theoretical considerations, other factors influ-
enced Peking’s attitude towards Pakistan. The Indian-Soviet Treaty contributed to 
China’s firm support of Pakistan, increasing China’s negative attitude toward India 
and its increasingly positive relations with Pakistan.
 Realpolitik strategic considerations along with principle of foreign policy 
influenced China’s position, as China did not want to see a new state of Bangladesh, 
likely to be friendly with rivals India and the Soviet Union, created on its border. 
These strategic concerns materialized following the emergence of the Bangladeshi 
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government’s pro-Soviet elements and initial economic agreements. China’s stance 
is also linked to its longstanding cordial relations with Pakistan and lack of border 
tensions with the country. According to the 1963 agreement, Pakistan yielded some 
1,300 square miles of Kashmir to China. Since then, China has linked up the old 
Silk Route Highway where it runs from Sinking to Gilgit in close proximity to the 
northern region of Ladakh near the ceasefire line.  Therefore, Indian occupation of 
Pakistan Kashmir would make China’s position insecure.  The threat of Chinese ag-
gression in 1971 prevented India from launching any mass offensive in Azad Kash-
mir.  China also helped Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. But China did not embark 
on any divisionary moves because of the threat that the Soviet Union could also be-
come involved. The Soviet Union in fact assured India that it would take action in 
Sinkiang in the event of a Chinese international attack. Bhutto responded by reject-
ing the possibility of Chinese diversionary moves. India, in response, predicted that 
China would not intervene on Pakistan’s behalf. Following this prediction, India 
moved her forces from its border with China to East Pakistan. However, protests 
from China did not effectively prevent India from violating China’s border with 
Sikkam. The first intrusion of Indian forces into Chinese territory was made on De-
cember 10, 1971, and the first protest in response was occurred on December 16th. 
The second protest note was lodged on December 27th, just after the second border 
violation on December 15th. The suggestion made in the first note to “immediately 
stop the activities of intrusion into Chinese territory” was reiterated in the second 
protest note. This time, however, China did not give an ultimatum as it had given 
during the War of 1965. China’s response was lukewarm this time around, the main 
reason being that China was not directly involved in the War of 1971 as it had been 
in 1965, since article nine of the treaty of Indo-Soviet cooperation made mutual 
consultations imperative in the case that any party “is attacked or threatened with 
attack.”  As a result, China could not help in Indo Pak war 1971 as China helped in 
the Indo-Pak War 1965.
 The Twenty Years Defence Pact between India and Russia confirmed that 
the Soviet Union would participate in any war on the side of India, “India could 
not have liberated Bangladesh (without) the treaty of friendship with the Soviet 
Union.”46 Premier Chou En-Lai on 31 January 1971 admitted that China’s assis-
tance “in the past has remained limited and that China could not do more.47 On 
December 14, Pakistan urgently appealed to China and the US for practical aid. 
It should be kept in mind that China’s lack of military involvement in the Indo-
Pakistani War was in line with its previous statements; at no time did China ever 
indicate the possibility of involving itself in the conflict.  As for China’s relations 
with Taiwan, China did not resort to use of force. Therefore, it seemed inconsis-
tent for China to assist Pakistan against Indian military aggression that had Soviet 
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backing. The lack of military support did not shake Bhutto’s belief in Pakistan’s 
friendship with China.48 President Bhutto visited Peking in February 1972. During 
the meeting, China decided to convert several Chinese loans to Pakistan into grants, 
and also postponed the payment of the loan given in 1970 by nearly twenty years. 
China also gave to Pakistan substantial military equipment, including tanks and jet 
fighters.
 Due to its important geo-strategic position, Pakistan is of extreme impor-
tance in Chinese foreign policy and is a key area in the South Asia region. China 
had ideological and strategic reasons for providing diplomatic assistance to Paki-
stan in 1971. China could not, however, contemplate military intervention in the 
context of the USSR-India Pact. Nonetheless, the position China took up during the 
East Pakistan crisis and later Bangladesh War enhanced the perception in Pakistan 
that China was Pakistan’s most “loyal” and reliable ally. This sentiment persists to 
the present day and colors attitudes towards China both in official circles and public 
opinion.
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